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Global Changes and the Context of Education, 
Democracy and Development in Eastern Europe 
Summary: 
The following essay deals with several aspects of change in Eastern, post-com­
" " munist Europe. This change - often labelIed as transformation when seen as 
a goal-directed process - is itself embedded in a globai context. It hints at a fun­
damental change of paradigmatic, social, political and power structures. In the 
given context of austerity policy and market ideology a new exclusiveness of ed­
ucation and a possible decay of the comparatively remarkable educational infra­
structure in Eastern Europe (and not only there) cannot be excluded. A conser­
vative revolution also evokes reactionary and chauvinistic tendencies - which 
might cause repercussions in the whole of Europe. The events in Eastern Eu­
rope are another example that democracy is not the outcome of a singular act of 
revolution - notwithstanding its necessity in order to overcome dictatorial 
structures - but a permanent task. 
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Globaler Wandel und der Zusammenhang von Bildung, 
Demokratie und Entwicklung in Osteuropa 
Zusammenfassung: 
Der folgende Essay befaßt sich mit verschiedenen Aspekten des Wandels im öst­
lichen, post-kommunistischen Europa. Zweifellos ist dieser Wandel - der un­
ter dem Aspekt eines zielgerichteten Prozesses meist als" Transformation" be­
zeichnet wird - eingebettet in globale Zusammenhänge. Diese deuten selbst 
auf einen fundamentalen Wandel paradigmatischer, sozial- und machtpoliti­
scher Strukturen hin. Im gegebenen Kontext von Sparpolitik und Vermark­
tungsideologie zeichnet sich eine neue Exklusivität von BiIdungschancen und 
ein Abbau der insgesamt beachtlichen Infrastruktur der Bildungssysteme in Ost­
europa, und nicht nur dort, ab. Eine konservative Wende weckt auch reaktionä­
re und nationalistische Tendenzen, die Rückwirkungen auf ganz Europa haben 
können. So gesehen sind die Ereignisse in Osteuropa ein weiteres Beispiel dafiir, 
daß Demokratie nicht Folge eines singulären revolutionären Aktes ist, so not­
wendig dieser auch sein mag, um diktatorische Strukturen zu überwinden, son­
dern eine permanente Aufgabe. 
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1. The context of change and the crisis of modern industrial society 
The explanation of social change was a central issue of nineteen's cen­
tury social science. True, there were different theories, but in genera! alI 
of them - those defining change as an revolutionary act and those defin­
ing it as evolutionary development - were based on the idea of a future­
oriented process: the impact of change was seen in the triumph over, as it 
was feIt, the insufficiencies of the past. Change created something that 
had not existed before. In the optimistic interpretations of the nineteen's 
century these changes were generally interpreted as "progress". In mod­
ern sociology, until recently, theories of change on a macro-!eve! cer­
tainly have not vanished but stepped back somewhat in favour of middle­
range theories on change of subsystems, institutions, and socia! groups 
rather than transformation of whole societies. However, in face of the pre­
sent changes which seem to be both profound and global, social science 
and humanities are confronted with a new phase of societal change and 
thus are in need of theoretical explanations and models helping to analyse 
the situation. 
One of the characteristics of the ongoing changes, and this makes them 
different from the "dynarnics and ideologies of those changes based in the 
nineteenth century, is a kind of Iooking back, an attempt to recover lost 
knowledge, meaning and structures. It is, as if society needed a "pausing 
for breath". We find this tendency as a new interest in historical values 
and structures, not seldom used or propagated as a remedy against a crisis 
of identity and consensus, we find it in a possible shift towards Eurocen­
tri sm, religious fundamentalism, philosophical communitarism, a trendy 
mood of apocalypse, mysticism and esoterics or, in sum, as an aIl-embrac­
ing and fundamental criticism of modern rationaJism in some concepts of 
"post-modernism". Its definitions show great diversity, but with regard to 
some basic characteristics some analysts, in search for an appropriate 
analogy, compare the future we are heading for with the Middle Ages, not 
only in respect to some superficial similarities, but both in respect to some 
functional characteristics and to "post-modernism" as an era, as it seems, 
between "no longer and not yet". 
For Umberto Eco it is mainly the dominance of visualism in our civiIisa­
tion, which reminds hirn of the Middle Ages, and indeed, a common inter­
pretation of one of the features of post-modernism says that it is replacing 
the objects by their images. Others may have different basic assumptions 
buf mostly come to similar conclusions about the growing importance of 
symbols over things. For example a Japanese social scientist, Taichi Sa-
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kaya, identifies as the main factor of change in modern society the grow­
ing scarcity of resourcesJ• The strategy in order to cope with scarcity for 
hirn consists of the devaluation of the material resources and of the cre­
ation of a new, immaterial, value structure and the production of sym­
bols. This inexhaustible pool of resources can, in principle, be shared by 
all and future will bring, he argues, an end of classical mass production 
and mass consumption of identical products. Instead, an era of individuali­
sation of production will come. In it, material worth will be replaced by 
highly diversified, individualised non-material values based on informa­
tion - about the social value of goods - and on symbols. In this system 
of non- material priorities he sees the analogy with the Middle Ages. 
Somewhat similar seems to be, what many analysts find future educa­
tion might need most urgently: it is not so much knowledge of facts -
"material value" so to say - but knowledge of relations, social com­
petence and, as Martin Baethge (a reputed German social scientist) formu­
lated, "the ability to decode symbols". 
Another analyst, however, Manuela du Bois-Raymonds from Leyden, 
attracted recently some attention among educationalists in Germany, be­
cause she predicted the end of compulsory education systems as no 
longer fit to meet the requirements of future needs. She gave the follow­
ing reasons for her argument: 1) the existing school system is not able to 
cope with growing individualisation of lifestyles and to integrate them 
into plausible and relevant processes of learning for its students; 2) youth 
has gained and still is gaining increasing power in many respects of so­
ciety, but not so in schoo!. There, power balance is kept only by a loss of 
educational engagement from the side of the school and a "quiet arrange­
ment" between teachers and students not to disturb each other too much 
and to keep an atmosphere of camaraderie which du Bois-Reymonds finds 
to be symptomatic for modern schools; 3) knowledge is increasingly be­
coming a commercial good and a growing market sector outside schools 
offers skills and knowledge more effectively than school does.2 
There is, however, criticism that those "post-modernistic" concepts of 
"individualisation" of values based on a "marketised" concept of society 
and a "commodification" of education is nothing else but a neo-conserva­
tive plot. In fact, many features of the present cultural, ethical, and politi-
1 Taiichi, S.: The Knowledge-Value Revolution. Tokyo 1991 
2 Frankfurter Rundschau, April 2, 1992 
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cal changes have the character of a conservative revolution, which sta­
bilis es and gives legitimacy in a situation of growing global polarisation 
and antagonism between rich and poor, between those who have food, ac­
cess to resources, capital, education and health care, and those who have 
not. 
It is probably true that these present trends are connected with a 
deepening crisis of our system as a result of a growing scarcity of re­
sources which must be exploited in order to keep the system running 
smoothly. Not only that the material resources are scarce, their process­
ing and usage is becoming increasingly risky for the ecological balance. 
This crisis of the modern industrial system and the corresponding strains 
come to be expressed in cuIture and society in many ways. 
2. Transformation 
The change in the post-socialist countries is an essential part of global 
changes and at the same time unique. Sometimes this task of transfor­
ming societies so profoundly is compared with post-war Germany or with 
post-fascist Spain. But not only are, in spite of so me similarities, the cir­
cumstances very different - these regimes were capitalist in essen ce, but 
also the political and economical context has changed - the mere dimen­
sions of transforming the former sociaIist, non-market, dictatorial so­
cieties are huge: "transformation" this time refers to a set of about 20 
states, a huge territory, some 430 million people and some hundreds of dif­
ferent ethnicities. There is no model and we do not dispose of theories on 
a transformation of such a character and of such dimensions. Apart from 
this, the fIrst optimism cooled down: the upheavals against the old 
regimes gave the peoples new freedom, pride and hope. However, the real 
existing world order threw them directly from the "Second" into the 
"Third World" in some respects and in face of some economical data: 
Third W orId means to be exposed to tariffs against free international 
trade, to be helpless against the dictate of raw material prices, it means 
monthly wages of 50 or 150 Dollars on an average, huge disparities be­
tween social cIasses as weH as political and social instability. All this has 
an enormous impact on the social coherence and the chan ces for democ­
racy in the region. Transformation has to count also with the risks. 
Generally the word "transformation" suggests that there is a c1ear start­
ing point and an equally c1ear end point. The end point, to begin with, is to 
"become Western", and seen from there the starting point in the minds of 
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many concerned and observers is near zero. In reality, it might be one of 
the central problems better to understand the material social and cultural 
preconditions of transformation: transformation of the former Eastern 
bloc is implicitly and explicitly most often connected with the idea of mod­
ernisation. Certainly technology - both technology of production and of 
political leadership was helplessly outdated - although modernisation 
was the rationale of communist ideology. In this sense, modernisation is 
most needed and one might speak of a "belated" or "catching-up-moderni­
sation". But does that mean that the societies in question should copy 
"more modern" societies or should they take up the threads after an inter­
rupt of some 40 years or more, or are there other options? 
I think there is a lack of analyses of the starting positions. Not so much 
analysis of the old regime's deficits in respect to the goal of transforma­
tion: free market and political pluralism - these deficits are evident and 
abundantly documented - but of the functional character of the former 
societies in respect to a relevant theory of change and transformation. Un­
fortunately, there is not only lack of analysing the starting position, but 
the goals and the ways of how to achieve the goals are somewhat nebu­
lous sometimes: not only that Western mass-industrial society in itself is 
quite diversified, but this type of technologically and economically mod­
ern society has become - exactly for its high level of development - a 
"risk-society" as some analysts caU it3• However, not to transform into 
this risk-society seems to be equally very risky. 
TheoreticaIly there are several possibilities of modelling transformation 
in the sense of modernisation: 
1) a model based on the philosophy copying of the highly modernised 
societies; 
2) a model of an utopian modernisation; it's designers could try to 
draft a "better", an "authentic" modernisation or, as for that, some­
thing like a "third-road-modernisation" trying to avoid the prob­
lems and losses of non- or anti-modernisation as weIl as those of 
modernisation; 
3) a model which would be critical against the present stage of West­
ern modernisation but which would, rather than aspiring to find a 
third road base its philosophy on the very principles of modernisa-
3 Beck, U.: Risikogesellschaft Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1986. (Edition Suhrkamp. 1365). 
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tion, that is, rationality and emancipation, arguing that historical 
modernisation in many ways has not yet fulftlled the promises of 
the classical modernisation project; a German scholar call this "re­
flexive Modernisierung"4; 
4) a "selective modernisation" based on a pragmatic analysis of mod­
ernisation gaps on the one hand and priorities and means available 
in the given country on the other. This model counts with a signifi­
cant difference of the modernisation levels which cannot be le­
velled quickly; 
5) a "partial modernisation"; the correspondent strategy would be 
based explicitly on the character of the former socialist societies as 
"partially modernised" societies and it would concentrate on mod­
ernising the non-modern features of these societies. This strategy, 
however, would have to be based on a more profound analysis of 
the modernistic and anti-modernistic strategies and on the out­
comes of these strategies in the different subsystems of former so­
cialist countries; 
6) a model which makes use of selected pre-modern features, struc­
tures and institutions of the former regimes in order to promote 
modernisation. Some analysts, in the light of some general tenden­
eies in the former Eastern bloc which show a tendency to combine 
inherited structures (of centralised and hierarchical control) with 
rules of a market economy, see exact1y this model of a "complemen­
tary modernisation"-strategy being realised5• 
What place has education in these models? If one analysies education 
under the old regimes, one will find that it was this subsystem which per­
haps more visibly than many others was characterised by the above men­
tioned aspect of "partial modernisation. " Educational policy in the respec­
tive countries stressed from the very beginning of erecting the socialist 
regimes most consequently the modernistic issues of massification of edu­
cation (alphabetisation in the underdeveloped countries), access to higher 
levels of education for those classes of society which had been more or 
less excluded from education, integration of general and vocational educa­
tion, a general high este em for technical and technology education and so 
on. 
4 see note Nr. 3. 
5 Bala, J./Bobach R.: Transformation als Modernisierung eine Diskussions-
skizze. In: IGW-Nachrichten, (1992) 3, pp. 27-52. 
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Apart from the fact that expansionist educational policy slowed down 
or stagnated since the seventies both for political and financial reasons, 
from the very beginning one equally can find anti-modernistic trends 
which result from the totalitarian, mechanistic philosophy of leadership 
and, correspondingly, a voluntaristic, dictatorial praxis of planning, con­
trolling and executing the educational system. 
Summarising these characteristics one might say that educational infra­
structure was highly modernised - especially in the formerly less de­
veloped countries modernisation achievements surpassed at times clearly 
those of the non-socialist countries - but this infrastructure produced an 
education which in effect was anti-modern in its contents and functions 
- then especially in those of social and civic learning. Whereas in the 
Western countries the school system tried to react on the changing con­
text of an highly developed industrial society which has become definitely 
more flexible, more pluralistic, and is based on a system of intrinsic con­
trol, the school system in the former socialist countries conserved a type 
of school typical for the time of early industrialisation and based on extrin­
sic contro!. 
As far as the ongoing changes and transformation strategies in the Eas­
tern European countries already had impacts on the educational systems, 
a trend becomes visible which is quite paradoxical: certainly the contents 
and functions of school on the one hand become rapidly more modern in 
the sense mentioned above, on the other hand restorative tendencies 
have appeared: the structure of the educational system is becoming much 
more flexible everywhere. Partly this is due to the particular phase of 
change in which different ways and compromises are sought. Thus, in 
most cases the question how many years should the gramm ar school be at­
tented, respectively if the old pre-war system should be restored or not, 
led to a variety of different forms where anything between four- to eight­
year types of upper secondary grammar schools ("gymnasium") can be 
found at the same time. In addition, there is a variety of experiments both 
with school types and with an inner differentiation of the curricula of the 
same school type. However, although there is a general acceptance of a 
consumer-oriented restructuring of the educational system, this is not 
easy to carry out partly for financial restrictions and partly for the great 
variety of opinions and consumer aspirations. 
It is part of the complicated situation in the respective countries that 
not only necessary and progressive changes occur but also changes 
adopted or sought after out of nostalgia or, worse, ultra-conservatism and 
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nationalism. Particularly, church affiliated groups try to get more in­
fluence over education especially in the field of "morals" and "ethics". 
Some of these issues are clearly reactionary like the official publication of 
the Polish Education Ministry's School Reform Bureau, which recom­
mends the re-introduction of physical punishment in schools: "Physical 
punishment, as long as it is not too painful and frequent, provides the 
child with the positive emotion of physical closeness to the tutor . . .  "6. 
In most of the new emerged states of the former Soviet Union, educa­
tional policy tries to restore the own cultural and national heritage as a 
basis for language of instruction, literature, civics and history teaching. 
Not seI dom the newly gained sovereignty turns against the educational as­
pirations of the non-majority ethnic groups. In parts where acute conflicts 
arose, where even is war, we do not know how school and education react 
in this situation, but is it realistic to expect school to resist general nation­
alistic moods? 
One of the most serious problems seems to be the financial situation in 
the context of a mixed application of rude market-philosophy on the one 
hand and of state control on the other. In this respect, the changes have 
brought with them developments which seriously end anger the achieved 
level of educational infrastructure in most of the respective states. 
This development, however, is to be seen again in the context of more 
global trends of change: the development of education after World War II 
was based on an idea of democratisation which not only incited a huge al­
phabetisation movement and the massification of middle and higher edu­
cational enrolment, but which propagated the conviction that modern so­
ciety is obliged to secure education as a basic human right, to compensate 
educational handicaps and to take educational care for all. It go es without 
saying that the enormous global expansion of education in these decades 
was not based on mere idealism: political sciences, sociology and last but 
not least economy provided theories which underlined the importance of 
education for the functioning of modern democracy and economy. 
This context has changed: some of the assumptions on the correspond­
ence between education and economic growth were too simple. The so 
called first oil-shock resulted in a slow-down of economic growth and the 
6 Quoted from: R. Pachocinski: Survey Study into Conditions, Problems and 
Policy ofEducation in Central Europe. Conference Paper. Warsaw/Amster­
dam, August 1992 
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last decade of recession and austerity policy has only added to the change. 
Also in Eastern Europe the new ideology has liquidated, together with 
communism, its ideology of mass education as a paramount factor of crea­
ting the "new man" as weH as a factor of production. Often the wish to 
transform the old system, which is seen to be responsible for all past and 
present drawbacks, results in the wish to turn back to the opposite. Thus 
there seems to be a general mood among educationalists in Eastern Eu­
rope which strongly favours the philosophy of concurrence and differen­
tiation in education and denounces comprehensive schooling as "com­
munist" and ineffective. Apart from this, it is also in line with the logic of 
new economics that new criteria for effectiveness in education emerge 
and become dominant: the market preferably directs investment there, 
where profit can be realised safely and quickly. In educational terms that 
means to invest into those children and adolescents who are the most 
talented or the most clever or the most fit to withstand stress and strain 
or whose parents are able to buy the critical item education. 
3. Integration and Disintegration 
There is a global trend towards integration, be it politically and economi­
caHy as "internationalisation", be it culturally as "multiculturalism", be it 
technically as global. networks of communication. The role of interna­
tional agencies grew considerably in the last few years. At the same time 
there are disintegrative tendencies: ne"" nationalism, even tribalism, fun­
damentalism and economical pOlarisation. At the first sight, the trends 
seem to be very different in Western and Eastern Europe, on the other 
hand a peculiar combination of both, integrative and disintegrative tend­
encies, is typical for both parts although there is a difference in emphasis 
and historical background. 
In the West we find - despite re cent drawbacks - an emphasis on 
transnational integration represented in the European Community, al­
though its strong bureaucrasy causes that many people become increas­
ingly concerned about the abstractness of processes and structures feIt to 
be totally out of their control. Apart from this, and in respect to the more 
than 20 states in North, Middle and Eastern Europe, waiting for an Euro­
pean integration, it is very questionable if the European Community, 
which was founded and has developed und er specific conditions, can con­
tinue just like before without a serious re-evaluation and probably some 
changes in order to cope with the new challenges. The European integra-
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tion process, some few years aga looked upon very optimistically is now 
in serious troubles, although the European idea still is alive. 
In spite of the mentioned global tendencies of integration, disintegra­
tive forces did not cease to exist even in Western Europe (Northern Ire­
land, Bask province, Corsica, etc.). On the contrary, some strengthened 
(Scotland) or even emerged anew (Northern Italy). It is not possible to 
say if this trend will end in the creation of ever smaller state units or a new 
infrastructure of regional units. Both state centred nationalistic and anti­
state regionalistic even urbanistic ideologies can be found. 
True, mobilisation of national and ethnic movements is ambiguous: it 
played, at least in the context of modern industrial society, a paramount 
role in the process of economic and political development and transforma­
tion. On the other hand it is one of the least controlable and most destruc­
tive forces of modernisation. The new nationalism in Eastern Europe and 
the corresponding disintegrative tendencies have often an atavistic, dull 
and in some regions a cruel appearance. Is this then an aspect of the above 
mentioned "catching-up modernization" meaning that there is an un­
changeable pattern of becoming a nation and that all the sometimes cruel 
and painful historical stages the established nations went through have to 
be repeated by the new nations? This is, indeed, not a pleasant perspec­
tive. On the other hand, how can we not concede the right of searching 
for identity and a state-form to emerging nations by applying the same 
seriousness we use towards established nations and states, be they small 
or large? 
Generally the question of ethnic groups, minorities and nation gives a 
new importance to what was until recently believed to be problems of the 
past. As far as minorities are acknowledged as such, they have (at least for­
mally) nearly all over Europe a certain status which grants them special 
group rights, one of them being the right of education in the minority's lan­
guage. In a context of nationalism, however, minorities are easily pro­
voked (or as for that: forced) to follow political philosophies which add to 
the disintegrative tendencies in a given region. 
Still, the migration of huge numbers of people into and across Europe 
might become more important, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Per­
haps the numbers of migrants sometimes predicted, speaking of tens of 
millions to come mainly from the former Soviet Union and from Africa, 
are exaggerated. However, migration is a reality, and not to see that Eu­
rope has become an immigration area is to close the eyes in front of real-
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ities. As far as the immigrants within the decades since World War II are 
concerned, they are nowhere seen as "minorities" despite the fact that 
some immigrant ethic groups outnumber the figures for minorities by far 
in most Western European countries and despite the fact that a certain 
fraction of them is living in a "foreign" country in the third or forth gener­
ation. Perhaps less the pressure of immigration, but the incompetence 
and paralysis of today's policy in this respect is a problem: its outcome 
cannot but be a growing racism and thus a strengthening of disintegrative 
tendencies. 
Disintegration has equally increased in countries which aspired to cre­
ate new integrated cultural and ethnic identities. Although perhaps the 
United States are the only (so far) functioning multi-ethnic society, one 
does no longer speak in America of a "melting pot", but rather of a "salad 
bowl" society, in which the respective ethnic and cultural groups more 
and more drift apart. Similarly - under due consideration of the dif­
ferences - the "melting-pot-policy" of the former USSR was a failure. Vi­
talij Kostomarov, former president of the Academy of Educational 
Sciences of the USSR, recently gave a self-critical resume in which he 
came to the conc1usion that the former cultural policy had failed totally in 
this respect. As a basie principle of this policy, Russian language was pro­
c1aimed to become the "second mother tongue" for the non-Russian popu­
lation of the USSR on the one hand, and the special ideological construct 
of the "multinational soviet culture" was developed on the other hand, 
which was proc1aimed to be "socialist in its content and national in its 
form "7. 
Probably we will have to learn, that the principle of ethnically ho­
mogenous nation-states has become more than ever a fiction, but also 
that the traditional politics of assimilation, integration or "melting" have 
failed. But how then could new structures be found ? Certainly, there is no 
easy ans wer to this question, but equally certain is, that we need a new bal­
ance between individual, group, local, regional, national and transna­
tional identities and rights. One could weil imagine that the borders of 
functional systems, for instance legal systems, until now coinciding with 
the state bord er become more open and more diversified without demo 1-
ishing them and without interfering with each other. Perhaps something 
like that could have emerged from disintegrating Czechoslovakia, where 
7 Kostomarov, V.: Sprachen und Kulturen in der Sowjetunion. Forschungsbe­
richt. Frankfurt am Main: Deutsches Institut f"ür Internationale Pädagogi­
sche Forschung 1992. 
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Slovaks asked for JulI sovereignty" in a common state. In any case, Eu­
rope will need such experiments of many different, innovative, and even 
seemingly "impossible" forms of coexistence beyond centralism on the 
one and separatism on the other hand. 
There is one recent event which ran counter to all present tendencies of 
supranational integration resp. national disintegration, and this was Ger­
man unification. Since Germany will hold a key position in the relation­
ship between Western and Eastern Europe, this context deserves special 
attention: unified Germany was put suddenly into the position of greater 
influence and even greater potential power and it is the question if it is pre­
pared to deal with this situation in a manner which is just and fair in its 
content and diplomatic and sophisticated in its form. To find such an ap­
propriate way of acting as a strong power is not at all easy. One should not 
forget, that Germany lacks (has lost long aga) the tradition of handling a 
European power position in a decent way. After unification in 1871 the 
German model of power in Europe was that of hegemony. This of course 
was not an original German idea, but it was a German and an European 
tragedy that Germany, as a young and dynamic power, did not find the ap­
propriate philosophy according to its power position, but behaved like the 
typical parvenu. 
Interestingly, at the same time when in Germany and Japan (in a some­
what varied form in the Soviet Union), countries competing to enter the 
club of the world powers, strength was interpreted as the absolute superi­
ority of the own culture, system andJor race and a general disrespect of 
others, in America on the other hand, the philosophy of "cultural relativ­
ism" not only as a social scientific school, but as a general idea, penetrated 
the whole society. Without this "culture of cultural relativism" the 
United States could probably not have become the 20th century world 
power they are: it was this general ideology of respecting poly-culturalism 
which enabled many societies to accept not only the power position of the 
US, but also to accept a certain Americanization, which, in the given con­
text, proved to be perhaps the only road of modernisation. All kinds of 
ideologies of exclusivity, hegemony and dominance, however, will lead in 
Europe (and as for that: everywhere else) sooner or later into catastrophy. 
However, not all recent German diplomatic moves towards Eastern Eu­
rope are encouraging. It is not only the suspicion that German diplomacy 
deepened (if not triggered) the Yugoslavian drama. It is also regrettable 
that once again a treaty with Czechoslovakia ended up to be ratified in a 
context of ambiguity over the interpretations of the past and suspicions of 
97 
claims for the future. Apart from this, a Czech newspaper reported that 
the German President von Weizsäcker mentioned in Prague that "Ger­
many has a particular relationship with Czechoslovakia. Similar to that 
which has France with Aigeria or Portugal with Brazil"8 Czechs who 
heard these words, were told to be surprised by this comparison since 
they don't feel that they have been ever a German colony. One also 
hardly could believe that the president wanted to evoke the reminiscence 
of the "protectorate" 1939-45. What then, did he really mean? Or was he 
only unable to put into unequivocal words what he meant? On the other 
hand there is sometimes critieism from the left in Czeehoslovakia itself, sa­
ying the new governmental policy would follow a "protectorate-eon­
cept". This of course is not my task to judge. 
In any case, both, a protectorate attitude as weil as a Germanophobia 
are dangerous: the post-war era in Europe is over, Germany has ehanged 
and so did his neighbours. The transformations and changes we are wit­
nessing and are parts of, impose, however, great responsibility on us in 
order not to waste what has been gained. 
Another question whieh arises here, is, if hints at "protectorate-rela­
tions" have not perhaps beeome presentable onee again. In fact, political 
thinking in this respeet seems to have changed dramatically: unthinkable 
still some few years ago, that a reputed and critical analyst of political 
scienee could have suggested "new forms" of eeonomieal help for the 
"mini-republics" in former Yugoslavia, by means of a co-operation with 
,,'patron-nations' - the Slovenes perhaps with the Austrian, the Croats 
with Germany and Italy"9. Again: looking at the global context it seems 
that these arguments are completely in line with a more general "new 
thinking": In an editorial about the dramatie situation in Africa the Ger­
man magazine "Der Spiegel" wrote that "a sort of humanistic colonialism 
will hardly be avoidable", in addition quoting a British expert who asks 
similarly: "is time ripe for a new imperialism?"IO. Perhaps nothing can il­
lustrate clearer the apparent direction change is taking presently. Since 
history has very few examples indeed for a "benevolent protectionism" 
and a "humanitarian imperiaJism", this direetion is not only backward but 
also dangerous. 
8 Rude pravo, July 5, 1991. 
9 E. Altvater on an international peace conference organised in April 1992 in 
Sarajevo by "Helsinki Forum" and other groups: "Die Festung Europa muß 
ihre Zugbrücken herunterlassen". In: Frankfurter Rundschau, April 3, 1992. 
10 Der Spiegel, (1992) 51, p. 152 and J. MacManus, ibid. p. 153. 
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4. Conclusion 
It might be questionable if we, as some believe, face changes which are 
so aIl-embracing and of such a kind that they only can be described as an 
allegedly new era of "Middle Ages". On the other hand - different con­
cepts of "post-industriaIism" reflect upon it - modern society is exposed 
to substantial changes. They are not the least caused by a general crisis. 
The growing scarcity of resources which can weIl mean the end of mass 
production and mass consumers society, is a crisis which affects the core 
of modern industrial society, namely the expansive exploitation of nature. 
There are two main strategies, how to cope with scarcity of ressources: 
to re-distribute of the given ressources or to find new ressources. Those 
could, after all - if material ressources come to an end - weH be imma­
terial ones like meaning, symbols and information. Hints for both 
strategies, a conservative revolution which fixes the gap between haves 
and have-nots as weH as the search for new paradigms, can be found. 
The consequences of the first, however, will have their impact on the 
educational and social systems for many years: whereas the contents and 
the methods of teaching have definitively be modernised (and are going to 
be modernised in Eastern Europe right now), there is a change in the glo­
bal tendencies of educational systems which tend to become more strati­
fied again. Perhaps, in the wake of the changed social poIicy and social ide­
ology, obligatory school attendance might come more and more under at­
tack. Was the slogan which expressed best the post-Second-World- War 
policy the "chance for education", later the "right for education", in the 
so called socialist countries even: the "obligation for education", than the 
new slogan could become the "privilege of education". 
In the modern sense of the meaning of the word "democracy", this new 
tendency is not increasing democratic tendencies in Europe. As for the 
contents of education in the context of integration - but also disintegra­
tion - in Europe, it must be clearly seen that education is not a decisive 
factor of social change as sometimes was believed. On the other hand, the 
education system is relatively autonomous and the actors of this system 
decide if they become the mere transmitters of poIitical programmes, or 
worse, of atavistic spirits, or if they stay aside, or if education - many pe­
dagogues and scientists hold this to be the most important core task of the 
education system - is preserving and passing on with its peculiar system­
"language" the message of humanism. 
